I don't agree with forcing people to have treatments they don't want just to satisfy society's norms and standards.
Unless some really new concept is posted, this will be my last post on this thread. SLB and I must agree to disagree, but I appreciate that he has put a lot of thought into his position. However, I take issue with the above statement.
Physicians and hospitals do not resort to the courts just to fulfill some power trip. JWs are well researched and written about, and as medical professionals, interested in upholding both the priciples of autonomy and their own oath, they carefully consider their options before seeking to force treatment on anyone.
Hence, they do not act "just to satisfy society's norms and standards." They act to achieve the highest ideals of morals and ethics on the planet.
That is why these difficult cases are referred for an in-house bioethics conference, and all posible courses of action and treatment recommedations are vigorously debated by a team of bioethicists who have made it their life mission to seek the patient's best long-term and short-term welfare. I have been present when two ethicists clashed regarding a JW patient, and I can assure you, both parties argued their positions passionately and well, to the point that I think there are some residual hard feelings (yes, they take it that seriously). Therefore, I reject SLB's charaterization of their goal, a characterization that trivializes and minimalizes the position of those that disagree with him.
Lastly, SLB is absolutely correct that this is not a "right to die" issue. The boy is not seeking to die because he is seeking treatment, and he is compliant with his other treatment recommendations. While this tack was taken in the past, no serious ethicist would frame the issue so now.
Edited to add:
TD responded while I was crafting my response, and he adtroitly tables a key issue, namely the distinction between the two standards (legal/medical).
To meet the clinical informed consent standard, minors refusing life-saving medical treatment (LSMT) need only have capacity, understand they might die, and not be coerced.[1] Conversely, the MM doctrine requires they be super-functioning minors who qualify to be exempted from the law of majority because they exhibit indicia of a well-functioning adult both in their day-to-day lives and in their medical decisions. This difference in the standards is predictable since medical informed consent applies even to routine, daily medical matters while the MM minor doctrine is most often invoked in high-stakes public policy or life-and-death medical decisions. It is reasonable to hold a minor seeking the right to refuse LSMT to a higher standard, [2] and the higher legal standard explains why two normally functioning Jehovah’s Witness adolescents over seventeen years-old failed to meet the test.[3] In sum, the MM doctrine capacity standard requires more of minors than the average-adolescent-on-the-street standard used by the medical community.
[1]See supra Part II.a.
[2] Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment Of Patients’ Competence To Consent To Treatment, 357 N. Engl. J. Med 1834, 1836 (2007); see also Lantos, supra note 44 (noting that as applied to adolescents, “the more serious the consequences of decision, the more rigorous that evaluation and standards for [decision-making capacity] should be.”).
[3]Application of Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 147 Misc. 2d 724, 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1990); see also In re E.G., supra note 56.